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NOTES
OPENING THE UMBRELLA: THE EXPANSION OF
THE PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES V. JENKINS
Melodie Bales+
You are a prosecutor. You are handed a case file concerning a recidivist
offender allegedly involved in a series of four robberies in your jurisdiction.
You are told to indict the suspect by the end of the day. After reading through
the file, however, it appears that although there is strong evidence the suspect
committed the most recent robbery, the evidence is weaker when it comes to
the other three. Do you charge the suspect with all four crimes? Do you wait
to see whether new evidence will surface later? If you are a federal prosecutor
in the Ninth Circuit, the decision is clear: indict the suspect on all four counts,
even if the evidence is weak.
Traditionally, prosecutors enjoy broad discretion when determining whether
to charge a person with a crime.1 Courts, however, must ensure that the
2government does not bring charges for improper purposes, such as retaliation.
The basis for this judicial oversight is to protect defendants' due process rights3
from government infringement. At bottom, due process is the foundation of
the U.S. criminal-justice system.
4
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2007, Mount St. Mary's University. The author wishes to thank Professor Cara H. Drinan
for her guidance; her fianc6, Rob, for his unwavering support; her family for their
encouragement; and the entire Catholic University Law Review staff and editorial board for their
assistance.
I. See Craig H. Solomon, Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: Divergent Lower Court
Applications of the Due Process Prohibition, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (1982).
2. Id. at 325.
3. See id The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates: "[n]o person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fourteenth Amendment contains its own Due Process Clause with respect to the states,
providing: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 325 (explaining that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide the constitutional basis for "prohibit[ing] the prosecutor's misuse of his
charging authority"). Specifically, the Supreme Court, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, stated that
vindictive prosecution violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711,725 (1969)).
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The doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness 5 is deeply rooted in Supreme
Court jurisprudence. 6  The doctrine originally arose to prevent judicial
vindictiveness-to protect defendants who successfully appealed convictions.7
The Supreme Court next applied the doctrine to prosecutorial charging
decisions, finding vindictiveness where a prosecutor increased charges from
misdemeanor to felony after a defendant exercised his statutory right to seek a
new trial.8 In Blackledge v. Perry, decided in 1974, the Supreme Court held
that any "increased punishment upon retrial after appeal . . . that pose[s] a
realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness' violates due process.9 Although the
concept of vindictive prosecution seems straightforward, the federal circuit
courts have interpreted "vindictiveness" in various ways and have grappled
with the doctrine's application.
10
Once a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness is shown, a presumption of
vindictiveness arises. 1 However, the prosecutor can rebut this presumption by
presenting objective evidence explaining the reason for the charges.' 2  The
federal circuit courts have interpreted and expanded the Blackledge principle,
5. Vindictive prosecution has been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit as behavior that results from "specific animus or ill will" or that occurs when a
prosecutor "charges a more serious violation . . . in retaliation for the exercise of a legal or
constitutional right in connection with the original charge." United States v. DeMichael, 692
F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1982).
6. See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798, 501 (1989) (discussing a significant number
of Supreme Court cases establishing and construing the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine).
7. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 (holding that judges ordering harsher sentences for
defendants who had successfully won a trial de novo upon appeal must base their sentencing
decision on "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding").
8. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974). "The Court has treated prosecutorial
vindictiveness and judicial vindictiveness as a single issue, developing a uniform presumption for
both types of cases." Jonathan D. Youngwood, Comment, The Presumption of Judicial
Vindictiveness in Multi-Count Resentencing, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 725, 731 n.36 (1993).
9. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27. Additionally, the Court noted that due process also requires
that defendants be free to exercise their rights to challenge their convictions without the fear of
retaliation by prosecutors. Id. at 28.
10. See United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 257 (6th Cir. 1979) (Keith, J., dissenting)
("Given the chaotic nature of the law in the circuits regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness, we
can expect further guidance on this question from the Supreme Court in the near future."); see
also Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 570 (1984) ("Pearce is not without its ambiguities
.... "); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Decisions after Pearce have
not been entirely consistent in applying the Pearce Principle."); Solomon, supra note 1, at 331-40
(discussing the various tests used by the circuit courts, which highlight that even slight variations
in interpretations of Supreme Court precedent can have a significant effect on vindictiveness
rulings).
11. United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1), 504 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 2007).
12. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28, 29 n.7 (noting an example in which a defendant's due
process was not violated because the prosecutor's subsequent harsher charge was not done in bad
faith).
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attempting to safeguard the rights of defendants while ensuring that
prosecutors continue to have broad discretion in making charging decisions. 13
United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1) came to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit after the government appealed the district court's
decision to dismiss the case based on its finding of an appearance of
prosecutorial vindictiveness. 14 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, finding that the defendant's confession to prior acts of illegal-alien
smuggling-given while testifying at her trial for importing marijuana--could
not be used as the basis for alien smuggling charges because its use raised a
presumption of vindictiveness that the government failed to rebut.' 5 The Ninth
Circuit denied a rehearing en banc, and a seven-judge dissent lamented the
extension of the doctrine. 6
This Note will examine the background and potential impact of Jenkins I on
the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness. First, this Note will examine the
origins of the doctrine in Supreme Court decisions and discuss how the federal
courts of appeal have interpreted the doctrine since its inception. Specifically,
this section will explore how the circuits have either narrowed or expanded the
scope of the doctrine over time. Second, this Note will address the Ninth
Circuit's application of the doctrine in Jenkins L In particular, this section will
investigate whether the Ninth Circuit properly applied the doctrine when it
affirmed the dismissal of criminal charges for vindictive prosecution based on
new charges brought during trial for conduct unrelated to the trial. Third, this
Note will evaluate the impact of Jenkins I on the Ninth Circuit and other
courts' precedent and predict the possible impact of the decision on the
doctrine. This section will show that Jenkins I effectively protects defendants
13. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasizing
that prosecutors must be given discretion to bring charges based on the "legitimate requirements
of the justice system," and noting that "[n]othing in Blackledge presumed to give a defendant a
free ride for separate crimes he may have committed, or to prevent a prosecutor from bringing
new charges as a result of changed or altered circumstances which properly bear on prosecutorial
discretion"); Hardwick, 558 F.2d at 302 (stating that adopting an "apprehension of
vindictiveness" standard rather than an actual vindictiveness standard would essentially "render
the prosecutor's discretion meaningless"); United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th
Cir. 1977) (explaining that the Blackledge Court's reasoning was based on its conclusion "that
fear of vindictiveness for exercising a statutory right to appeal was as forceful as actual
vindictiveness in chilling a defendant's 'free and unfettered' choice in deciding to appeal"
(citation omitted)).
14. Jenkins I, 504 F.3d at 697-98.
15. Id. at 697, 701-02.
16. United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins It), 518 F.3d 722, 723-29 (9th Cir. 2008)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of the rehearing en banc). The chief dissent was authored
by Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, and was joined by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, and Judges
Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Richard C. Tallman, Consuelo M. Callahan, Carlos T. Bea, and Milan D.
Smith, Jr. Id. at 723. The dissent argued that the Jenkins I majority not only "contradict[ed]"
Ninth Circuit precedent, but also created a circuit split that would only further confuse the
doctrine's application. Id. at 723-29.
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who confess to crimes while testifying at trial for different crimes. Thus, as
this section will demonstrate, prosecutors will be forced to charge defendants
with all possible crimes, even if the evidence is weak at the time the charges
are brought. Finally, this Note will conclude that Jenkins I was wrongly
decided because it expanded the doctrine beyond the scope recognized by other
circuits, overextending the protections of the Due Process Clause.
1. THE ORIGINS AND COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROSECUTORIAL
VINDICTIVENESS DOCTRINE
A. The Supreme Court Announces the General Rules
In 1969, the Supreme Court acknowledged the issue of vindictiveness in
North Carolina v. Pearce.17 In Pearce, the Supreme Court reviewed two
consolidated cases, both of which involved a convicted criminal defendant who
successfully challenged his conviction and who, upon conviction after retrial,
received a longer sentence without apparent justification for the extension.,
8
The Court held that "[d]ue process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must
play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial," and therefore,
"whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a
new trial, the reasons for doing so must affirmatively appear."'
' 9
In Blackledge v. Perry, the Court extended the Pearce rule to include
prosecutorial vindictiveness. The defendant in Blackledge was convicted of a
misdemeanor and exercised his right to seek a new trial.21 The prosecutor then
charged Perry with a felony for the same actions that resulted in Perry's
22misdemeanor conviction. The Court found that even though there was "no
evidence that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or maliciously," his actions
violated Perry's right to due process because "a defendant [must] be freed of
apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation. 23
In neither Pearce nor Blackledge did the Court require a showing of actual
vindictiveness on the part of the judge or prosecutor in order to establish a due
17. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
18. Id. at 713-16, 726.
19. Id. at 725-26. The reasons given by the judge "must be based upon objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time
of the original sentencing proceeding." Id Further, the Court recognized that "due process...
requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of
the sentencing judge." Id. at 725.
20. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974).
21. Id. at22.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 28. Specifically, the Court was concerned that prosecutors might discourage
appeals by "upping the ante" on defendants, in effect threatening defendants that harsher charges
would be brought in subsequent trials. Id. at 27-28.
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process violation.24 The Court was concerned that the fear of vindictiveness
would deter defendants from exercising their rights, therefore it held that due
process is offended by actions that "pose a realistic likelihood of
'vindictiveness.' 25
While Pearce and Blackledge arose in the post-trial appeal setting, the
Supreme Court has also addressed vindictiveness in the pretrial setting. 6 In
the pretrial setting, however, the Court has been more willing to extend
deference to prosecutorial discretion and less willing to find a presumption of
vindictiveness. 27  In United States v. Goodwin, the Court indicated that the
timing of the prosecutor's action affects whether the prosecutor's actions are
presumed to be vindictive. 28 One of the primary reasons for this distinction
lies in the Court's general vindictiveness rationale. For example, in
Blackledge, the Court indicated that vindictiveness was more likely to be found
in situations in which a prosecutor's actions could be driven by an effort to
save time and money by discouraging defendants from exercising their legal
rights, such as in seeking a retrial.2
24. See id. at 28 (noting that Pearce did not require "actual retaliatory motivation," and
finding that causing apprehension of such motivation is sufficient to raise the presumption of
vindictiveness).
25. Id. at 27-28.
26. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362-65 (1978).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380-82 (1982) (finding no
presumption of vindictiveness where a defendant requested a jury trial based on misdemeanor
charges and was later charged with a felony, because prosecutors have broad discretion to amend
charges based on newly discovered information or modified trial strategy); Bordenkircher, 434
U.S. at 358-59, 362-65 (finding that due process was not violated where a prosecutor carried out
a threat made during plea negotiations, when the defendant did not accept the government's plea
offer). It is nearly impossible to prove vindictiveness in the material setting after Bordenkircher,
and it has even been argued that Bordenkircher shifted the underlying rationale of the
vindictiveness rule from protecting a defendant from government pressure that would deter the
defendant from exercising a legal right, to a focus on protecting the defendant from government
retaliation. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 330-3 1.
28. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381-82 (noting that a prosecutor's initial charging decision
"should not freeze future conduct" and "may not reflect the extent to which an individual is
legitimately subject to prosecution," and concluding that "the timing of the prosecutor's action in
this case suggests that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted").
29. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27. In Goodwin, the Court found that the defendant's
request for a jury trial, as opposed to a bench trial, did not provide the prosecutor with a sufficient
incentive "to engage in 'self-vindication,"' and therefore did not give rise to a presumption of
vindictiveness. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383. The defendant in Goodwin argued that the
government was retaliating because the defendant requested a trial by jury, but the Court found
that a trial by jury is not as burdensome on the government as a retrial, which was the issue in
Blackledge. Id Thus, the Court found that the likelihood of "institutional bias" present in
Blackledge was absent in Goodwin because the incentive to avoid a costly retrial was also absent.
Id. The Court noted that in the Blackledge context, a prosecutor has a "personal stake" in
deterring a new trial, whereas prosecutors generally are not concerned with whether a trial will be
a bench or jury trial. Id.
2010]
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Although Pearce and Blackledge are settled law, the Court has admittedly
"been chary about extending the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness when
the likelihood of vindictiveness is not as pronounced as it was in Pearce and
Blackledge.' '30 The Court has repeatedly noted that the government generally
has broad discretion when bringing charges, and has explained that "[t]his
broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute
is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." 31 The Court has recognized that
there are multiple factors that prosecutors weigh when making charging
decisions, including "the strength of the case" that "courts are [not] competent
to undertake."
32
B. Application of the Doctrine in the Ninth Circuit
1. The Rule and the Rationale Behind the Rule
The seminal Ninth Circuit case applying Pearce and Blackledge is United
States v. Ruesga-Martinez.33  In Ruesga-Martinez, the Ninth Circuit found
vindictive prosecution where the prosecutor increased the charges against the
defendant from a misdemeanor to a felony after the defendant pled not guilty
and refused to waive his rights to be tried by a district judge or a jury.34 In so
doing, the court established the rule that where a defendant is reindicted after
exercising a procedural right, "the prosecution bears a heavy burden of proving
that any increase in the severity of the alleged charges was not motivated by a
vindictive motive."
35
30. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 566 (1984) (noting that the reluctance to extend
the Pearce presumption stems from the concern that the presumption works to bar "legitimate"
criminal prosecution).
31. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 606-07 (1985). Though Wayte arose in the
context of selective prosecution, the Court pointed to Borden/archer and Goodwin when
discussing the great difficulties and potential policy concerns inherent in judicial review of
prosecution decisions. Id. at 607.
32. Id. The Court listed factors weighed by the government when making charging
decisions, including "the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall
enforcement plan." Id. Additionally, the Court noted that considerations of judicial economy
counsel against allowing judges to review charging decisions, because such review "delays the
criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives
and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by
revealing the Government's enforcement policy." Id. Thus, the Court has indicated that judicial
review of charging decisions presents both separation-of-powers concerns and practical issues.
See id.
33. See United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976); see also
Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713,
737 n.79 (1999).
34. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d at 1368, 1371. In this case, the defendant refused to waive
his rights to trial by a district judge and trial by jury. Id. at 1368.
35. Id. at 1369. The court stressed that it was neither admonishing the prosecutor nor
questioning the prosecutor's charging decision, but rather, it was eliminating any apprehension of
[Vol. 59:855
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A key policy consideration in these cases is the deterrent effect on
defendants because courts do not want defendants to refrain from fully
exercising their rights out of fear of government retaliation.3 6 In United States
v. Griffin, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the need to curb the deterrent effect
that subsequent charges might have on a defendant's decision to exercise a
right,37 but explained that when assessing the deterrence factor, courts must
also remember the need to respect prosecutorial discretion:
Prosecutors require a certain amount of discretion in bringing
indictments, including the extent to which an indictment covers all
the acts of the defendant which constitute crimes. Nothing in
Blackledge presumed to give a defendant a free ride for separate
crimes he may have committed, or to prevent a prosecutor from
bringing new charges as a result of changed or altered circumstances
which properly bear on prosecutorial discretion.
38
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has traditionally deferred to the charging decisions of
prosecutors, while emphasizing the prophylactic nature of the rule.39  In
possibly the most cited statement regarding the rule, the Ninth Circuit
vindictive prosecution when exercising a legal right. Id. In addition, the Ninth Circuit later held
that procedural rights, the exercise of which is relevant to determining vindictiveness, are not
confined to constitutionally protected rights; so long as the right at issue is sufficiently similar to
those at issue in Pearce and Blackledge, it will be protected. See United States v. DeMarco, 550
F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1977). Pearce addressed the exercise of a right to appeal, and
Blackledge addressed the exercise of a right to a new trial. Id. In DeMarco, the defendant
"insisted" on exercising his right to change venue. Id. After the court granted the motion to
change venue, the government obtained a second indictment against him based on conduct known
at the time of the first indictment. Id. at 1226. Further, the prosecutor had previously threatened
to bring the additional charges if the defendant successfully changed venue. Id.
36. DeMarco, 550 F.2d at 1227; Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d at 1369.
37. United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980). In Griffin, the
Department of Justice delayed in filing a second indictment against the defendant because the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was still investigating the crimes that formed the basis for
the second indictment and were "wholly unrelated" to the crimes charged in the first indictment.
Id. at 1347. However, the court noted that defendants should not be able to point to the
deterrence effect of alleged vindictive prosecution as a "shield" to avoid "legitimate" prosecution.
Id. at 1348 (finding that because the FBI's investigation was ongoing, the defendant should have
been on notice that additional charges might be filed).
38. Id. (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974)).
39. DeMarco, 550 F.2d at 1227. The court pointed out that the rule limits prosecutorial
discretion and checks retaliation against defendants who take advantage of their procedural rights.
Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, has identified situations where the threat of additional charges
would not deter a defendant from exercising a procedural or constitutional right. For example, in
United States v. Robison, the defendant won a reversal of his death sentence, only to be
subsequently indicted on other charges. United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.
1981). Robison argued that the government was retaliating against him because he exercised his
rights in prior cases, successfully getting one conviction reversed and other charges dismissed;
the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. Id. at 1272-73. The court found that the later charges-
carrying only a ten-year maximum sentence--could not have deterred Robison from seeking a
reversal of his death sentence. Id. at 1273.
2010]
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explained its rationale: "[t]he prophylactic rule is designed not only to relieve
the defendant who has asserted his right from bearing the burden from 'upping
the ante' but also to prevent chilling the exercise of such rights by other
defendants who must make their choices under similar circumstances in the
future." 40
2. The "Appearance of Vindictiveness" Test and Rebutting the Presumption
Once It Has Been Established
When assessing prosecutorial vindictiveness claims, the Ninth Circuit takes
several steps. In Griffin, the Ninth Circuit articulated a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach, under which it assessed whether the "overall picture"
reflects the appearance of vindictiveness. 41 Specifically, the court looked at
the charging decision to determine whether it "suggest[ed] the 'appearance of
vindictiveness."' '42  If the defendant establishes facts that trigger the
presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut it by showing that
"the prosecutorial decision was justified by either independent reasons or
intervening circumstances.
' 43
3. "Factual Nucleus" of Charges Is Only One Factor in Determining
Vindictiveness and Is Not a Decisive Factor
The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between subsequent charges based on
the same or related conduct as the original charge and subsequent charges
40. DeMarco, 550 F.2d at 1227.
41. Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1347-48.
42. Robison, 644 F.2d at 1272 (citing Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1347). The appearance-of-
vindictiveness approach has been criticized for being overreaching. See Solomon, supra note 1,
at 342-43. The Ninth Circuit has found an "appearance of vindictiveness ...even when the
defendant has not ... asserted any legal right." See United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557
F.2d 645, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Solomon, supra note 1, at 333 (noting that the
Alvarado-Sandoval Court held that when a prosecutor raised a charge from a misdemeanor to a
felony after a defendant delayed in filing a plea, the prosecutor's actions suggested the
appearance of vindictiveness). However, the appearance-of-vindictiveness approach has also
been heralded as a way to provide defendants relief in situations where vindictiveness would be
impossible to detect because the theory turns on a prosecutor's subjective, and presumably secret,
motives. See Nancy Rader Whitehead, Note, Evaluating Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Claims in
Non-plea-bargained Cases, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1148 (1982) (noting that "rarely will the
evidence clearly indicate that retaliation was the only possible motive for the charging decision").
43. Robison, 644 F.2d at 1272. In Griffin, the Ninth Circuit indicated that evidence
suggesting that an "intervening circumstance," other than the defendant's assertion of his rights,
between the lesser initial charge and the greater subsequent charge, such as additional findings
from an ongoing investigation, reduces the appearance of vindictiveness. See Griffin, 617 F.2d at
1348 (finding that where an investigation was ongoing, the defendant should have expected that
the subsequent charge could be brought at some point). Another example of an intervening
circumstance includes new facts or evidence discovered by a prosecutor after a trial. See United
States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 939 (9th Cir. 1976). In Preciado-Gomez, the court went
on to point out that where "valid reasons exist" for "pursuing more serious charges," "courts
should refrain from interfering with the prosecutor's right to exercise his discretion." Id.
[Vol. 59:855
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based on conduct unrelated to the original charge.44 It has held that there is a
greater likelihood of vindictiveness when the subsequent charges are based on
conduct related to the conduct at issue in the original charge.45 Conversely,
vindictiveness is less likely when the subsequent charge is based on conduct
46unrelated to the conduct in the original charge. However, this factor alone,
though important, is not dispositive in determining whether the presumption
arises.47  In sum, the Ninth Circuit has adopted an appearance-of-
vindictiveness test based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding new
charges, with one factor being whether the new charges arise out of the same
facts as the initial charges.4 8
44. See United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1978); DeMarco, 550 F.2d at
1226. Ultimately, however, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention that
Blackledge was distinguishable, noting that "[t]he factual nucleus of both indictments was the
same." Id.
45. See Groves, 571 F.2d at 454 (explaining that although the factual similarities between
the charges is a factor for determining vindictiveness, it is only one of the factors). In Groves, the
court found that the two crimes charged were "interrelated" because the first charge of cocaine
possession was based on evidence discovered during an interrogation related to the second charge
of marijuana trafficking. Id.
46. See Griffin, 617 F.2d at 1347-48. In Griffin, the Ninth Circuit found that the
government's delay in bringing a second indictment did not raise the presumption of
vindictiveness in part because the second indictment was based on a separate investigation into
separate conduct by a separate government agency. Id. In addition, it reiterated the holding in
Groves that the relationship between the conduct underlying the indictments is only one factor,
"in the context of the whole case," that courts use to determine whether prosecutorial conduct
rises to the level of vindictiveness. Id. at 1348. The Ninth Circuit has stated that when "the
second charge is unrelated to the first, the presumption [of vindictiveness] does not arise." United
States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 1986), amended on other grounds by 855 F.2d 621
(9th Cir. 1988).
47. Groves, 571 F.2d at 454; see also Robison, 644 F.2d at 1272-73. In Robison, the court
found that no presumption of vindictive prosecution existed when the two sets of charges "arose
from events separate and distinct" from each other. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that whether the
new charges arise "out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the original charge ... is one of
the key indicia scrutinized by courts when confronted with a claim of vindictive prosecution." Id.
at 1272-73. Though it is not a dispositive factor, the court stated that the defendant's failure to
show that the charges in the two indictments were based on similar facts "weakened" the
defendant's case. Id. The court further noted that the defendant's argument essentially boiled
down to a fallacious "post hoc" argument-the mere fact that the second charge followed the
exercise of a right did not mean that the second indictment was brought because the defendant
exercised his rights. Id. at 1273.
48. Robison, 644 F.2d at 1272.
2010]
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C. Restrained Approach to the Doctrine Favoring Prosecutorial Discretion in
Bringing Charges
1. The Majority Approach: Distinguishing Between Subsequent Charges
Brought for the Same and Other Crimes
The consensus among the federal courts of appeals that have addressed this
issue is that separate charges based on separate crimes do not raise the
presumption of vindictiveness.49 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has recognized that prosecutors may add charges in the course of
a trial without violating the defendant's right to due process because the
government has broad discretion in making charging decisions. 50 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that the presumption
of vindictiveness does not arise where the prosecutor brings subsequent
charges based on conduct unrelated to earlier charges. 51 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that "[a] presumption of
vindictiveness arises only when a prosecutor chooses to bring a more serious
charge against a defendant in a second trial. 52  The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a presumption of
vindictiveness does not arise when, among other things, the criminal activity
alleged in a subsequent indictment is separate and apart from that alleged in the
first. 53
49. Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 501 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 171
F.3d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 244 (6th Cir. 1980);
see United States v. Peoples, 360 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Gary, 291 F.3d
30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Humphrey v. United States, 888 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11 th Cir. 1989).
50. See United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1364 (5th Cir. 1984). According to the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Krezdorn, courts should not look at the various factors, such as the
timing of added charges or the nucleus of facts upon which the charges are based. Id. Nor should
courts attempt to "strike the delicate balance between the rights of defendant and prosecutor," but
rather, courts should look at the bigger picture. Id. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit has held that no
presumption will arise "[i]f any objective event or combination of events in those proceedings
should indicate to a reasonable minded defendant that the prosecutor's decision to increase the
severity of charges was motivated by some purpose other than a vindictive desire to deter or
punish appeals." Id. at 1365. Conversely, if the proceedings reflect no possible evidence that the
charges were brought for a purpose other than vindictiveness, the presumption properly arises and
the government must rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Id
51. Humphrey, 888 F.2d at 1549. In Humphrey, the defendant claimed that because the
government filed charges while he pursued habeas relief following his conviction, the
government's conduct raised the presumption of vindictiveness. Id. at 1548. However, the court
found that these facts took the case out of the Blackledge rule, which only proscribes "retaliation
by substituting a more serious charge for the original charge." Id. at 1549.
52. Peoples, 360 F.3d at 896 (finding that the presumption of vindictiveness did not arise
when the government renewed its notice to seek the death penalty after the defendant was
awarded a new trial even though the notice was withdrawn during the first trial).
53. See Gary, 291 F.3d at 33-34 (finding that the government exercised proper authority in
issuing a second indictment, even though the defendant had already successfully appealed,
explaining that even though the government brought a second indictment against the defendant
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In United States v. Andrews, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach to the presumption of
vindictiveness, distinguishing between a prosecutor's decision to substitute
charges and the decision to bring additional charges based on independent
events.54  The Andrews court refused to extend the presumption of
vindictiveness to a situation where the government brought a conspiracy
charge that arose out of the same facts as the original charge, but where the
court found that the new charge was additional, as opposed to substitute, and
distinct from the original charges. 55 Addressing the Ruesga-Martinez decision,
the Andrews court found that the Ninth Circuit inappropriately extended the
prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine, stating that the "broad and strong
language" of Ruesga-Martinez was "philosophically incompatible" with the
Sixth Circuit's interpretations of Pearce and Blackledge.56
after the defendant successfully challenged her sentence on the first indictment, the government
had the right to bring indictments for all of the defendant's criminal activity).
54. See Andrews, 612 F.2d at 241, 243-45 (explaining that when "alleged criminal conduct
will support only a single charge, with the prosecution having the option of charging the
defendant under different provisions of the law carrying varying penalties . . . once the judgment
is made as to which penal statute is to be invoked, the full extent of prosecutorial discretion has
been exercised"). The same is true of a final sentencing decision made by a judge in the Pearce
context. Id. at 241. In contrast, when a prosecutor does not "exhaust[] [his] arsenal of potential
charges with the initial indictment," and subsequently brings new, additional charges based on a
separate substantive offense, "the full extent of prosecutorial judgment and/or discretion [has] not
been exercised" and no presumption of vindictiveness arises. Id. The Sixth Circuit explained that
although the difference between added and substituted charges is a "subtle," but "critical"
distinction, it is one that has been recognized by other courts. Id. at 242-43.
55. See id. at 241. In Andrews, the defendants were indicted for narcotics offenses, among
other things, and eventually posted bail. Id. at 237. After making bail, the government charged
the defendants with conspiracy, in addition to the narcotics charges. Id. The defendants
responded by arguing that the conspiracy charges were brought in retaliation for asserting their
right to bail. Id. The Sixth Circuit found that although the subsequent charges arose out of "the
same total factual pattern" as the initial charges, conspiracy is a separate crime and therefore
constituted an additional, as opposed to a substitute, charge. Id. at 241. Ultimately, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court, which wrongly applied the standard for substituted
charges. See id. at 245.
56. Id. at 244. The court noted that while it strongly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
vindictiveness jurisprudence, it agreed with the Fifth Circuit's "basic approach" to the doctrine.
Id. The court also identified Ruesga-Martinez as the source of the "appearance of vindictiveness"
standard. Id. at 243 n. 10. The Andrews court rejected the appearance-of-vindictiveness standard,
and instead relied on the "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" standard, finding it to be more
grounded in Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 244. The benefit of the realistic-likelihood test is
that it "strikes an appropriate balance between the apparent vindictiveness and actual
vindictiveness standards," protecting "a defendant's due process rights while allowing the
prosecution sufficient opportunity to justify its actions." Solomon, supra note 1, at 346. Judge
Gilbert S. Merritt, Jr., in his concurring opinion in Andrews, went so far as to state that the
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness "is theoretically endless and unmanageable unless limited
to the post-conviction, double jeopardy context." Andrews, 612 F.2d at 246 (Merritt, J.,
concurring). Judge Merritt was concerned that the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine is based
on "elusive" concepts that fail to take into account the adversarial nature of the criminal-justice
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also found
that the presumption of vindictiveness does not arise where subsequent charges
are based on different conduct than the original charges. 57  In Williams v.
58Bartow, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a child in 1996.
At the defendant's trial, two witnesses testified that they too had been sexually
assaulted by the defendant in 1990. The defendant was subsequently convicted
of sexual assault for the 1996 incident twice, and in the third trial the
government charged the defendant with two additional counts of sexual assault
based on the earlier testimony. 59 The defendant argued that the additional
charges were vindictive, but the Seventh Circuit disagreed. 60 The court noted
that the new charges were based on a factually distinct crime unrelated to the
original charges. Significantly, the court pointed out that the evidence
presented at trial by the 1990 victims, under oath, gave the prosecutor "new
reasons for bringing the charges based on the earlier incident.' 62 The Seventh
Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court had not ruled on the precise issue
presented: whether Blackledge applies in cases where the defendant is charged
for unrelated crimes after a successful appeal, rather than for crimes arising out
of the same factual scenario.63 The court ultimately held that if a prosecutor
brings charges based on criminal conduct unrelated to that which supported the
initial charges, "the defendant must demonstrate actual vindictiveness rather
than relying on the presumption recognized in Blackledge and Thigpen."64
system, including the multiple factors that prosecutors take into account when bringing charges.
Id. at 246-47. In particular, Judge Merritt stated that eliminating the appearance of vindictiveness
is an "unworkable goal" in a process that, by its nature, is competitive and heated. Id. at 247.
The appearance test has also been criticized for its low burden of proof that "enables defendants
to successfully challenge enhanced charges too easily." Solomon, supra note I, at 343 (noting
that under the appearance test, courts often disregard objectively plausible explanations by
prosecutors for added subsequent charges).
57. See Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 501 (7th Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 495.
59. Id at 495-96. The prosecutor stated that he did not bring charges earlier because he
needed more evidence. Id. at 494-95; accord United States v. Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 988 (2d Cir.
1974) ("It is one thing to increase a charge from manslaughter to murder, and quite another to
charge a defendant, subsequent to a successful appeal, with a second murder.").
60. Williams, 481 F.3d at 501.
61. Id. (citing Humphrey v. United States, 888 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989)) (noting
that it is proper to distinguish between charges based on the same set of facts and charges based
on different facts).
62. Id. (noting that even though the prosecutor had police reports from the 1990 event, once
the prosecutor had the testimony of the girls, he took a "new approach" to the prosecution).
63. 1d. at 502. The court reiterated that the Eleventh Circuit found this distinction
significant, reasoning that the presumption does not apply where later charges relate to "other
criminal conduct." Id. The court also found that the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion
in Martinez. Id. at 502-03 (citing United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 1986)).
64. Id. at 502. The Seventh Circuit noted the emphasis the Wisconsin state court placed on
the fact that the prosecutor brought additional charges only after the two 1990 victims testified at
trial. Id. at 503. Thus, "the[] circumstances were ... vastly different from those confronted by
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit follows the same
rule, holding in United States v. Johnson that "a new federal prosecution
following an acquittal on separate federal charges does not, without more, give.. . . . ,,65
rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. In Johnson, the government did not
explain why it waited until the defendant had been acquitted of the first
charges before bringing the second set of charges. 66  The court even
acknowledged that it was "conceivable" that the new charges were brought to
retaliate against the defendant for exercising his right to a jury trial, which
67resulted in an acquittal. However, the court concluded that there was no
"realistic likelihood" of vindictiveness because the government might have had
other reasons for not bringing the charges earlier, therefore the presumption of
vindictiveness did not arise. The Second Circuit, in Johnson, relied heavily
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in
United States v. Esposito, in which the court held that a second set of charges
predicated on the same criminal conduct as prior charges---of which the
defendant was acquitted-did not trigger a presumption of vindictiveness.
69
Although Esposito did not deal with separate charges based on separate
criminal conduct, the Third Circuit generally noted that new charges supported
by evidence did not raise a presumption of vindictiveness because the charges
were brought to punish the defendant for the crimes he committed and not for
the defendant's exercise of a right.7° In addition, both the Second and Third
Circuits noted the possible negative consequences a contrary holding might
have on the criminal-justice system, namely that prosecutors would be forced
to bring every conceivable charge at once--"overcharg[ing]" an offense-to
avoid being barred from bringing additional charges at a later point.
71
The Second Circuit addressed an issue related to vindictiveness in United
States v. Bryser, holding that a defendant's testimony at trial for one set of
charges could be used as the basis for bringing subsequent charges. 72  In
the original prosecutor in the 1990 incident, when [the victims] were five and six year[s] old,"
respectively. Id. Because the 1990 victims were older, "they were better suited to offer
testimony," thus giving the prosecutor a new, non-vindictive, reason to bring the charges. 1d.
65. See United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1999) (following the
holdings of the United States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits).
66. Id. at 141.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court noted that the government added weapons charges after the defendant was
acquitted of his RICO charges, and the government may have decided that the weapons charges
were "superfluous unless the RICO prosecution proved unsuccessful." Id.
69. Id.; see United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 1992).
70. Esposito, 968 F.2d at 304.
71. See Johnson, 171 F.3d at 141-42 (worrying that prosecutors would "overcharge"
defendants initially); Esposito, 968 F.2d at 306 (finding that the presumption would "fashion[] a
new constitutional rule that requires prosecutors to bring all possible charges in an indictment or
forever hold their peace").
72. United States v. Bryser, 95 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Bryser, the defendant argued that charges brought against him subsequent to
his testimony in court should be thrown out because he testified to the criminal
conduct while on trial for another crime.73 The court found that the defendant
could not possibly expect he would be immune from prosecution of other
crimes if he admitted to them on the stand.74 The Second Circuit, consistent
with its application of the vindictiveness doctrine, found that granting the
defendant immunity would "lead[] to the absurd result that incriminating
statements may not be used as evidence because they were made otherwise in
aid, or under the umbrella, of a constitutional right."
7Z
Therefore, the majority of circuits that have addressed this issue have held
that the presumption of vindictiveness does not arise where subsequent charges
are brought for different crimes than those originally charged.
2. Overcoming the Presumption: Various Ways by which the Government
Can Prove Charges Are Not Vindictively Motivated and Thus Rebut the
Presumption
Once the presumption of vindictiveness has been raised, the burden shifts to
the government to provide objective, non-vindictive reasons for bringing the
subsequent charges. 76 In general, the federal courts of appeals give prosecutors
the benefit of the doubt that charges are brought for legitimate reasons. 77 For
78this reason, the courts accept a variety of explanations for charging decisions.
Additionally, courts have found delayed charges may be justified, and
therefore do not necessarily give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness.79
73. Id. The defendant pointed to Simmons v. United States, which held that if a defendant
takes the stand in his own defense, his testimony may not be used against him with respect to the
initial charges. Id; see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
74. Bryser, 95 F.3d at 186-87.
75. Id. at 187 (noting also that "[a]ncillary 'losses' of constitutional rights may often attend
the commission of criminal acts").
76. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982) (citing North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969)) (citing the Pearce rule and reiterating that the objective
information must be entered into the record so that "the constitutional legitimacy of the increased
sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal"); United States v. Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 360 (5th
Cir. 2008) ("Even if a defendant establishes a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, however, the
government still has an opportunity to proffer legitimate, objective reasons for its conduct.");
United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 241 n.6 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting that the Supreme Court
has not resolved whether substituted charges could be justified).
77. See United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding the
presumption rebutted where the government brought superseding charges to correct a charging
mistake); United States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding the presumption
rebutted where new charges were based on evidence that was previously unavailable to the
prosecution); United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding the prosecution
might have had some legitimate reason that was not fully revealed at trial).
78. See Barner, 441 F.3dat 1319; O'Hara, 301 F.3dat571;Johnson, 171 F.3dat 141.
79. See O'Hara, 301 F.3d at 571 (finding the presumption rebutted where witness testimony
became available after the initial charging decision); Johnson, 171 F.3d at 141 (refusing to find
the presumption when the government did not provide a reason for delay in bringing the
[Vol. 59:855
Curbing the Expansion of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
The circuit courts have identified various ways prosecutors can demonstrate
that allegedly vindictive charges were not brought in retaliation against a
defendant. 80  For example, the prosecutor may rebut the presumption of
vindictiveness by showing that new evidence was obtained after the original
81 82charges were brought,81 or that an intervening event occurred. Additionally,
the prosecution could point to "mistake or oversight in the initial action, a
different approach to prosecutorial duty by the successor prosecutor, or public
demand for prosecution on the additional crimes allegedly committed. 83
Thus, the general rule among the circuits is that a variety of explanations by
the government can rebut a presumption of vindictiveness once it is raised.84
additional charges, reasoning that the government might have originally believed it was not
necessary to bring the additional charges).
80. See Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Andrews, 612
F.2d at 245 n.14 ("Inadvertence and prosecutorial inexperience would be within the range of
explanations blunting a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness."). In Andrews, the court
recognized the distinction between added and substituted charges, finding that additional charges
based on separate crimes could raise the presumption of vindictiveness, which the prosecution
could rebut by introducing evidence to "reasonably explain or justify the action taken and negate
any inference of vindictiveness in fact." Andrews, 612 F.2d at 245. The Sixth Circuit, in
Andrews, found that this standard incorporated the defendant's and the prosecution's
perspectives, and also provided the trial court with discretion in assessing the veracity of the
prosecution's purported motives. Id.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468, 480 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding the
presumption rebutted where new charges were based on new evidence); Hardwick, 558 F.2d at
301.
82. See Byrd v. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v.
Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1365 (5th Cir. 1983)) (finding that an increase in charges did not raise
the presumption of vindictiveness because an amendment to the Texas Penal Code drastically cut
the sentence of the original indictment).
83. See Hardwick, 558 F.2d at 301. The Fifth Circuit has also found that when prosecutors
are making arguments like those noted in Hardwick, "the burden of proof (to a preponderance of
the evidence) remains on the defendant who raised the affirmative defense" and only shifts to the
prosecutor if the record reveals no possible objective reason for the prosecutor's decision to bring
additional charges. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d at 1365. In addition, it is important to note that these
possible arguments are "illustrative rather than exhaustive." Hardwick, 558 F.2d at 301 (finding
that a prosecutor's decision to bring more severe charges against a defendant could be easily
explained). Consistent with the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit has held that an increase in
charges was justified when a new prosecutor was assigned a misdemeanor case and then added a
felony charge. See United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]his was a
reasonable step for the prosecutor to take.").
84. See, e.g., United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1319 (1 lth Cir. 2006); O'Hara, 301
F.3d at 571; Johnson, 171 F.3d at 141; Byrd, 733 F.2d at 1138; Andrews, 612 F.2d at 245 n.14;
Hardwick, 558 F.2d at 301.
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II. SITUATING UNITED STATES V. JENKINS WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS JURISPRUDENCE
A. Jenkins I Works its Way to the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit most recently addressed the doctrine of prosecutorial
vindictiveness in United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1).85 In October 2004,
Sharon Ann Jenkins, a U.S. citizen, was twice caught at the United States-
Mexico border attempting to smuggle undocumented aliens into California.
86
Jenkins was first caught on October 19, 2004, at which time she admitted to
being paid to smuggle non-citizens. 87 Jenkins was caught a second time on
October 20, 2004, waived her Miranda rights, and told officers that although
she had been paid to drive the vehicle into California, she was unaware that
there were undocumented aliens hidden in the vehicle. 88  However, the
government did not charge Jenkins for either border-crossing attempt.
89
On January 9, 2005, Jenkins was again stopped at the border, and a search of
her vehicle revealed large amounts of marijuana.90 After border agents read
Jenkins her Miranda rights, she claimed that she thought she was smuggling
undocumented aliens across the border and did not know about the
marijuana.9 1 Jenkins was charged with illegally importing marijuana into the
United States, and at trial she testified in her own defense. 92  Jenkins's
testimony included a confession to smuggling undocumented aliens on two
prior occasions and echoed her statements to the border official at the January
incident that she believed she was once again smuggling undocumented aliens,
and not marijuana.
93
While the jury deliberated in the marijuana case, the government charged
Jenkins with smuggling an undocumented alien, and later charged her for both
October 2004 incidents. 94 In the district court, Jenkins successfully moved to
dismiss the alien-smuggling charges on the basis that the charges were
vindictive.95  Jenkins claimed that "the government brought the alien
smuggling charges in retaliation for her exercising her right to testify" in her
85. United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1), 504 F.3d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 2007).
86. Id. at 697-98.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 698.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Jenkins pointed to the October incidents, admitting that she had been paid to bring
non-citizens across the border twice before and that she had been caught both times. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The jury convicted Jenkins of the marijuana smuggling charges, and Jenkins pled
not guilty to the alien-smuggling charges. Id at 698 & n.l.
95. Id.
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own defense. 96 The government argued that the charges were not vindictive
because even though the government theoretically could have brought the
charges earlier, Jenkins's testimony under oath regarding the earlier crimes
strengthened the government's case. 97 The government appealed the district
court's dismissal to the Ninth Circuit.
98
B. The Ninth Circuit's Response to the Arguments in Jenkins I
1. The Majority Opinion of Jenkins
The Ninth Circuit in Jenkins I noted from the outset that it was addressing a
claim of presumptive vindictiveness rather than actual vindictiveness. 99 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the filing of the alien-
smuggling charges created the appearance of vindictiveness thus triggering a
presumption of vindictiveness. 1 ° The court reached this conclusion upon
determining that the government had a strong case against Jenkins before she
ever testified at the marijuana trial.10 1 Specifically, it pointed to Jenkins's
October admissions to border officials and her admission in January to the
border official regarding the October incidents.'0 2 In addition, the court flatly
rejected the government's argument that the presumption of vindictiveness
does not arise in cases where the subsequent charges "do not arise out of the
same nucleus of operative fact."' 0 3 The court stressed that the relatedness of
the conduct upon which the charges are based is just one of the many factors
affecting a vindictiveness determination.104
The court then turned to the question of whether the government rebutted the
presumption of vindictiveness, concluding that it did not.'0 5 The court stated
that to overcome the presumption, the government "must show that the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 699.
99. Id. Jenkins argued that the government brought the charges stemming from the October
incidents because she testified at trial, thereby raising the presumption of vindictiveness. Id. at
698-99.
100. Id at 699-701.
101. Id. at 700. The court noted that the government's case "essentially was open and shut
even before Jenkins testified in court." Id.
102. Id. The court pointed out that although Jenkins received Miranda warnings before the
second and third statements, the record was not clear that she had received the warning before the
first statement in October. Id. at 700 n.2.
103. Id. at 700-01.
104. Id. at 701. The court acknowledged that Martinez appeared to foreclose the possibility
that a presumption of vindictiveness can arise in situations where the subsequent charges are
unrelated to the earlier charges. Id However, it also noted that Martinez relied on Robison to
reach this conclusion, and that Robison stated that the "relatedness of the charges 'is neither
dispositive nor essential to prove vindictiveness."' Id. (quoting United States v. Robison, 644
F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981)).
105. Id. at 701-02.
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additional charges 'did not stem from a vindictive motive, or [were] justified
by independent reasons or intervening circumstances that dispel the appearance
of vindictiveness." ' 10 6  The government again argued that although it had
evidence before trial, once Jenkins admitted to the October crimes under oath,
the government had "no choice but to bring char es" because "to walk away
from [the opportunity] would be inexcusable."' ' The court rejected this
argument and agreed with the district court's observation that the government
had more evidence before Jenkins's testimony than is generally needed for a
conviction. 108 Finding that the government did not overcome the presumption
of vindictiveness, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the indictments related to the two October incidents.1
09
2. The Dissent ofJenkins II and the Possible Impact of the Decision
After affirming the district court's decision in 2007, the Ninth Circuit denied
the government's petition to rehear the case en banc in 2008 in United States v.
Jenkins (Jenkins I/). 110 Seven judges dissented from the denial of rehearing,
concluding that Jenkins did not establish the presumption of vindictiveness,
and that the government's actions were well within its discretion.111  At the
outset, the dissent pointed out the "well-established principle that courts should
tread upon prosecutorial charging decisions with hesitation." 112 The dissent
concluded that the majority had effectively usurped the prosecutor's role,
deciding that the government should have brought the charges earlier because
it could have. 
13
106. Id. at 701 (quoting United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.
1982)).
107. Id. (alteration in original). The government also argued that it did not wait to file the
charges until after the trial was over because it wanted to avoid appearing vindictive. Id. at 702.
The court rejected this argument as well, finding that the government should have known Jenkins
would testify about the two October crimes on the stand, and should therefore not have been
surprised when she did. Id.
108. Id. at 701-02. The court stated that "although a confession in open court certainly
added to the repertoire of evidence against Jenkins, we find the government's explanation
unpersuasive." Id. at 701.
109. Id at 702. Judge Suzanne B. Conlon, Senior United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation, dissented from the decision in Jenkins I for
many of the same reasons articulated in the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
Therefore, this Note will not explore each dissent in detail; rather, this Note will focus on the
dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, which incorporates Judge Conlon's concerns.
110. United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins I), 518 F.3d 722, 723 (9th Cir. 2008).
111. Id. at 723-24 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
112. Id. at 724. The dissent cited the Supreme Court's language in Wayte dealing with
selective prosecution, which stated that "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to
judicial review" because courts simply cannot assess the strengths of a given case, or the
government's motives and stake in a given case. Id. at 725 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 607 (1985)).
113. Id. at 725. The dissent argued that courts are in no position to weigh the same factors
that the government does because courts have a very limited perspective of the charging process.
[Vol. 59:855
Curbing the Expansion of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
In reaching this conclusion, the dissent highlighted several places where it
believed the majority opinion diverged from Ninth Circuit precedent. 114 First,
the dissent stated that the presumption of vindictiveness is not triggered when
the new charge arises out of a different factual nucleus rather than the same
nucleus. 5' It further noted that the Seventh' 1 6 and Eleventh'' 7 Circuits
followed the same rule.
The dissent also pointed to United States v. Baker, a Ninth Circuit case
standing for the proposition that "the content of a defendant's testimony on his
own behalf can be used as the basis for a new prosecution against him."" The
dissent noted that the rationale behind this rule is that defendants should not be
able to testify to crimes and then expect that the government will be barred
from prosecuting that crime. 19 Additionally, in Jenkins I, there was evidence
Id. The dissent admonished that the opinion ignores "the Supreme Court's caution against
encroaching upon prosecutorial charging decisions by independently weighing the strength of the
government's evidence." Id.
114. Id. at 725-28.
115. Id. at 725 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 1986)).
116. See id. at 726-27. The Seventh Circuit addressed the precise issue in Williams v.
Bartow. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text. In Williams, the defendant was on trial
for child molestation in 1996, and a victim who was molested by the defendant in 1990 testified
at the trial, leading the government to charge the defendant for the 1990 acts. See Williams v.
Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 501 (7th Cir. 2007). The Jenkins 11 dissent pointed out that after the
prosecution introduced new charges based on the 1990 event, the Seventh Circuit found that the
charges were not vindictive and, therefore, could stand. Jenkins 11, 518 F.3d at 726 (O'Scannlain,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). The Williams court had made a clear
distinction between new charges based on related events and new charges arising out of different
events. Williams, 481 F.3d at 502-03. The dissent in Jenkins I noted that the Jenkins 11 decision
came out the exact opposite way, despite the fact that the facts ofJenkins I were closely aligned
with those in Williams. Jenkins II, 518 F.3d at 726 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
117. See Jenkins II, 518 F.3d at 726-27 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc). The dissent found that the majority opinion was at odds with the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Humphrey v. United States. Id. In Humphrey, prosecutors brought
additional auto-theft charges against the defendant while the defendant was challenging a prior
conviction. Humphrey v. United States, 888 F.2d 1546, 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1989). The Eleventh
Circuit found that because the charges were brought for different conduct than that originally
charged, no presumption of vindictiveness arose. Id. The Jenkins 11 dissent specifically noted
that the Eleventh Circuit recognized a distinction between Blackledge and Humphrey, because
Blackledge simply proscribed "substituting" harsher charges, whereas Humphrey was based on
entirely new charges arising out of "independent acts." See Jenkins II, 518 F.3d at 727
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
118. Jenkins I1, 518 F.3d at 727 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc) (citing United States v. Baker, 850 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant's
argument that his confessions at trial could not be used against him)). In Baker, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the rule established by the Supreme Court in Harrison v. United States that "'a
defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible against him in a later proceeding."' Baker,
850 F.2d at 1370 (citing Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222 (1968)).
119. See Jenkins II, 518 F.3d at 727 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc). The concern of the dissent is that the Jenkins II rule is at odds with Baker and also
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that Jenkins had not been read her Miranda rights before her first confession at
the first October incident, making the government's argument that the in-court
testimony strengthened the case more plausible.'
20
In addition, the dissent was concerned that the Jenkins I rule was overly
broad, and would have the practical effect of requiring a vindictiveness ruling
whenever a criminal defendant has been previously charged with a crime.
121
Finally, the dissent noted that the Jenkins I decision created a circuit split on
the issue of whether separate charges that are based on separate criminal
conduct can trigger the presumption of vindictiveness. 122  The dissent sided
with the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, concluding that the presumption
should only arise where the new charges are brought based on the same crime
and are harsher.' 23 In closing, the dissent reiterated the untenable precedent set
by Jenkins I and lamented the fact that the court had overstepped its
boundaries, becoming too judicially active in the determination of when and
where to bring char es-traditionally, decisions primarily within the
prosecutor's discretion.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit, in both Jenkins I and Jenkins II, believed that the
decisions were consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent in treating the factual
provides defendants with the incentive to testify to other crimes on the stand, to immunize
themselves against possible future charges. See id. The dissent pointedly opined that the
majority "create[d] the preposterous rule that a defendant can shield himself from further
prosecution for unrelated crimes by openly admitting to them on the stand." Id.
120. See id. at 724 & n.1; see also United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1), 504 F.3d 694, 704
(9th Cir. 2007) (Conlon, J., dissenting) (pointing out that even the majority recognized that there
is no evidence Jenkins received the proper Miranda warnings at the first October incident, and
noting that while confessions to border agents are contestable by defendants, confessions under
oath are "virtually unchallengeable" and therefore much stronger evidence). The dissent in
Jenkins I also argued that Jenkins's confession at trial served as an intervening cause, which
normally justifies subsequent charges and rebuts the presumption of vindictiveness. Jenkins I,
504 F.3d at 704 (Conlon, J., dissenting).
121. Jenkins 11, 518 F.3d at 727 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc). The dissent pointed out that the traditional vindictiveness standard required a court to find
vindictiveness only where a charging decision poses "'a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness,"'
id (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)), but that the Jenkins rule pushes the
court beyond its traditional role, requiring it to judge whether the government had a strong
enough case to charge the defendant earlier. Id.
122. Id. at 728 (relying on United States v. Peoples, 360 F.3d 892, 892 (8th Cir. 2004), in
which the Eighth Circuit held that the presumption is limited to cases where harsher charges are
brought in a subsequent trial).
123. Id. (finding that generally, vindictiveness "'involves a showing that the prosecutor has
re-indicted the defendant and increased the severity of the charge, after the defendant has
exercised a statutory or constitutional right"' (quoting United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836
(9th Cir. 1980))).
124. Id. The dissent predicted that Jenkins would lead to the "perverse result of compelling
prosecutors to rely on ever-weaker evidence in bringing charges, lest they lose the opportunity to
pursue those charges." Id.
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nucleus of charges as only one factor in determining vindictiveness. The
dissents, on the other hand, concluded that the Jenkins I decision not only
veered away from Ninth Circuit precedent, but also diverged from other
circuits that found the factual nucleus of charges to be a decisive and crucial
factor in determining whether vindictiveness occurred.'
26
II. JENKiNsINOT ONLY REFLECTS A SHIFT IN NINTH CIRCUIT
JURISPRUDENCE, IT SOLIDIFIES A SPLIT WITH THE CONSENSUS OF OTHER
CIRCUITS
A. Jenkins I Did Not Confine the Presumption to Instances Where Subsequent
Charges Are Based on the Same Underlying Conduct
In Jenkins I, the defendant committed three distinct and separate crimes,
each occurring on different dates.1 27 The Ninth Circuit in Jenkins I concluded
that because the defendant admitted to the two prior crimes when she was
caught committing them, and then again while testifying in her own defense,
the government was barred from prosecuting those two crimes.' 28  This is
precisely the kind of judicial oversight of prosecutorial charging decisions that
other courts have avoided.1
29
Jenkins I departed from the Ninth Circuit's precedent set forth in United
States v. Martinez, which clearly stated that the presumption of vindictiveness
does not arise when the later charges are not related to the initial charges.' 30 In
clear contradiction to this precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Jenkins I stressed that
125. Jenkins 1, 504 F.3d at 700-01.
126. Jenkins I, 518 F.3d at 725 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
127. Jenkins I, 504 F.3d at 698. Jenkins attempted to smuggle undocumented aliens into the
United States on October 19, 2004, and October 20, 2004, and attempted to smuggle marijuana on
January 9, 2005. Id
128. Id. at 702.
129. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (finding that the government has
broad discretion to prosecute, because "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to
judicial review"); see also United States v. Barner, 441 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11 th Cir. 2006); United
States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 243-44 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that
prosecutors have "traditional and proper discretion in deciding which of multiple charges against
a defendant are to be prosecuted or whether they are all to be prosecuted at the same time"
(internal citation omitted)).
130. See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v.
Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The defendant's position is weakened by the fact
that the instant prosecution is based on a different set of facts from those previous
prosecutions.")) ("If ... the second charge is unrelated to the first, the presumption does not
arise."); see also United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that
"an investigation into conduct different from that which has already been made the subject of an
indictment should not be limited by the time schedule established for the earlier prosecution").
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the nucleus of events upon which the charges are based is a non-determinative
factor,' 31 even though it was the decisive factor in Martinez.
132
Jenkins I also split with the consensus among the circuits that had addressed
this issue that the nucleus of events plays a significant role when determining
whether the presumption arises. 133 The distinction between charges based on
the same conduct and charges based on different conduct makes sense, given
the rationale and effect of the distinction 134 and the Supreme Court's wariness
in extending the doctrine. 135 In Goodwin, the Supreme Court reiterated that
due process only requires the presumption in cases where prosecutors may be
retaliating against defendants who have exercised a right. 136 The Due Process
Clause, however, does not provide criminals with blanket immunity for any
criminal acts admitted in the course of trial. 137 Yet the Ninth Circuit in Jenkins
I held exactly that-that such confessions cannot be used against criminals if
the government could potentially have brought the charges earlier.
1 38
Under the Jenkins rule, the defendant not only receives a windfall by
escaping meritorious prosecution, but the prosecutor is barred from charging
the defendant with a legitimate crime, even when the crime is unrelated to the
original crime. Thus, a prosecutor is placed in a tricky predicament: either
bring every potential charge based on every possible crime against a defendant
at the same time regardless of the strength of the evidence, or delay bringing
all possible charges and risk losing the chance of ever bringing them.
Curtailing the prosecutor's charging discretion in this way seems
counterintuitive and antithetical to our criminal-justice system. If Jenkins I
had dealt with charges arising from the same nucleus of events, it would make
more sense for the court to presume vindictiveness in the subsequent
prosecution. If a prosecutor increased charges after the defendant exercised a
legal right, that decision would be difficult to justify to a court and would
131. Jenkins 1, 504 F.3d at 700-01.
132. Martinez, 785 F.2d at 669 (noting that Blackledge never intended to give "the defendant
a free ride for separate crimes he may have committed").
133. See Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 501-03 (7th Cir. 2007); Johnson, 171 F.3d at
141; Humphrey v. United States, 888 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir. 1989); Andrews, 612 F.2d at
244.
134. See United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins I), 518 F.3d 722, 723-29 (9th Cir. 2008)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). The debate over whether
added charges should be distinguished from substituted charges is not a recent development, and
commentators have recognized that the distinction has created confusion among courts. See
Whitehead, supra note 42, at 1145 (pointing out that disregarding the distinction could force a
prosecutor to charge a defendant with every possible crime in order to avoid a vindictiveness
charge later in the proceedings).
135. See Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 566 (1984).
136. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1982).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Bryser, 95 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 1996).
138. See United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1), 504 F.3d 694, 700 (9th Cir. 2007).
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reflect a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness."' 39  However, when
determining whether an actual, realistic likelihood of vindictiveness existed,
the Ninth Circuit seemed more focused on deciding whether the prosecution
could have charged the defendant earlier, thereby substituting its own
judgment on charging decisions that are traditionally left to the prosecutor's
broad discretion.
40
The Supreme Court has not applied the presumption of vindictiveness when
additional charges have been brought against a defendant for crimes unrelated
to the original crimes, 4 1 but that is exactly what the Ninth Circuit did in
Jenkins I 4  This decision effectively bars prosecutors from bringing
subsequent charges based on criminal conduct known by the government at the
time the initial charges were brought once a trial begins. 143  Therefore,
prosecutors will be forced to bring all possible charges at the outset of a case,
thus drastically reducing the prosecutor's discretion in making charging
decisions1 44
139. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (internal quotations omitted).
140. See United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins I), 518 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 2008)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Jenkins I, 504 F.3d at 700.
The Jenkins 1H dissent pointed out that the Ninth Circuit's inquiry into whether prosecutors could
possibly have brought charges at an earlier time was wrong, and that the court should have
instead been testing whether the prosecution's actions reflected a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness. Id. It has been argued that the appearance test ultimately "places an undue
burden on the government to justify its actions" because the test creates too high a bar for the
government to overcome. See Solomon, supra note 1, at 342. Additionally, Solomon argues that
when courts apply the appearance test, which imposes closer review of charging decisions, they
ignore "the adversarial nature of the criminal justice process." Id.
141. See Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether Blackledge applies in cases where new charges are
based on different crimes than those originally charged).
142. See Jenkins 1, 504 F.3d at 700-01 ("[R]elatedness of the charges 'is neither dispositive
nor essential to prove vindictiveness."' (quoting United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272
(9th Cir. 1981))).
143. See United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 243 (6th Cir. 1980) ("We do not read
[presumption-of-vindictiveness precedent] as taking away from prosecutors their traditional and
proper discretion in deciding which of multiple charges against a defendant are to be prosecuted
or whether they are all to be prosecuted at the same time." (citation omitted)).
144. Cf United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
prosecutors might overcharge defendants to avoid being barred from bringing charges later);
United States v. Esposito, 968 F.2d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that a Jenkins-like
application of the presumption would create a new rule "requir[ing] prosecutors to bring all
possible charges in an indictment or forever hold their peace").
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B. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Recognize the Explanation Offered by the
Prosecution to Rebut the Presumption of Vindictiveness, Contrary to Other
Circuits
The government in Jenkins I provided several reasons for bringing the new
charges later than was possible, but the Ninth Circuit rejected them.
1 45
Primarily, the prosecutor pointed to Jenkins's confession to both October 2004
incidents while testifying under oath at trial. 146  The court rejected this
explanation, finding that the prosecution could have brought the charges earlier
because Jenkins already confessed to those crimes at the time of each incident
to border officials.
147
However, the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Williams v.
Bartow, a case procedurally similar to Jenkins .148 In Williams, the court
found the sworn testimony of sexual assault victims much more persuasive and
significant than their accusations outside of court, especially because before
trial, the only report the prosecutor had from the girls was given when they
were quite young. 49  Similarly, the testimony given by Jenkins was stronger
evidence than her out-of-court confession to border officials. 150 As the dissent
in Jenkins I pointed out, it is much easier for defendants to challenge
confessions made to law-enforcement officers than it is to challenge
confessions made under oath.
151
Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Jenkins I should have given more weight to
Jenkins's sworn confession and should have found that the confession was an
intervening cause for bringing the later charges. 152 Instead, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the distinction between in-court, under-oath confessions, and
an out-of-court statement to an arresting officer was insignificant and thus
foreclosed prosecution of those crimes. 153 In effect, the court sided with the
defendant on principle rather than deciding the case based on precedent.
145. Jenkins 1, 504 F.3d at 701-02.
146. ld. at 698.
147. Id. at 700-01. The Ninth Circuit admitted, however, that one of the confessions might
not have occurred subsequent to proper Miranda warnings. Id. at 700 n.2. But see Johnson, 171
F.3d at 141 (finding that even though the government did not provide an excuse as to why it
waited to bring additional charges until the defendant was acquitted by a jury, the presumption
did not arise because the government could have had a legitimate reason for the delay).
148. See Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 501 (7th Cir. 2007).
149. Id at 501.
150. Jenkins 1, 504 F.3d at 701; cf United States v. Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 362 (5th Cir.
2008) (ruling that a concession in open court could serve as the basis for added charges).
151. Jenkins 1, 504 F.3d at 704 (Conlon, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed to the possibility
that officers did not read Jenkins her Miranda rights before the first confession, which could
serve as a basis for her to challenge the admissibility of the evidence. Id.
152. See id; see also United States v. Bryser, 95 F.3d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to
provide immunity from prosecution based on incriminating statements made during the course of
a trial for other crimes).
153. Jenkins I, 504 F.3d at 701-02.
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C. The Underlying Rationale of the Doctrine Does Not Support the Jenkins I
Decision, Because Jenkins's Testimony Was Not Burdensome to the
Government
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated one method of identifying
vindictiveness: an examination of the burden placed on the government by a
defendant's exercise of a right. 154 In Blackledge, the Court noted that because
new trials are so costly for the government, prosecutors have a "considerable
stake" in deterring defendants from appealing. 155 Therefore, the rule against
vindictive prosecution exists, at least in part, to affect the incentive a
prosecutor may have to use additional charges as a means to prevent costly
criminal trials. 156 It makes sense, then, that the presumption is triggered more
easily in cases where the government is burdened by the defendant's actions.
The converse of this rule also makes sense: in cases where the right
exercised by a defendant does not burden the government, the presumption is
less easily triggered. In Jenkins I, the right exercised by the defendant was
testifying in her own defense.' 57 The burden placed on the government by the
exercise of this right was far less than that imposed by an appeal or a retrial. In
keeping with this aspect of the Supreme Court's rationale behind the
vindictiveness rule, the presumption of vindictiveness should not have arisen in
Jenkins L 158
D. The Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Doctrine Should Be Cabined Rather than
Expanded, Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's Holding in Jenkins I
The Supreme Court has reiterated that, in general, the decision whether to
prosecute rests solely with the government. 159 Although the federal courts of
appeals agree with this premise, Jenkins I marks a dramatic shift in the type
and intensity of judicial scrutiny of government charging decisions.1 60 As the
154. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 383 (1982) (finding that where harsher
charges are brought following a defendant's request for a jury trial, the presumption does not
arise because a jury trial is not necessarily more burdensome than a bench trial); Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29 (1974) (finding that the presumption arises more easily when harsher
charges are brought during a retrial, because the government must expend much time and effort to
retry a defendant).
155. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27.
156. See id. at 27-28.
157. United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins I), 518 F.3d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (O'Scannlain, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
158. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27-28.
159. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (noting that "[i]n our
criminal-justice system, the Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute," and
that when courts scrutinize charging decisions, they must be careful not to "undermine
prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy").
160. See Jenkins II, 518 F.3d at 725 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) ("Given the Supreme Court's admonition against judicial oversight of prosecutorial
charging decisions, it is not surprising that the doctrine of presumed vindictiveness has been
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Supreme Court noted, courts are not in a good position to review decisions to
charge because the government considers many factors when making charging
decisions.
161
In Jenkins I, the court reviewed the government's evidence with respect to
Jenkins's prior criminal conduct before Jenkins testified, and determined that
because the government had a strong enough case before hearing the
testimony, the fact that its case became stronger after the testimony was of no
consequence. 162 It appears that after Jenkins I, the Ninth Circuit will permit
courts to substitute their own judgment as to when certain charges could or
should have been brought instead of confining its reviews to the real question:
whether the government truly acted with vindictiveness.' 
63
In addition, the Ninth Circuit's rule is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
warning against judicial oversight of charging decisions.' 64  Such judicial
scrutiny is not good for any party involved criminal proceedings. It is not good
for defendants who will face more charges based on less reliable evidence. It
is not good for prosecutors who will be placed in a very difficult position with
respect to charging decisions. It is not good for the integrity of the criminal-
justice system because it could result in admitted criminals gaming the system
to receive immunity.
E. Jenkins I Will Lead to Further Erosion of the Doctrine and Greater
Judicial Oversight of Prosecutorial Discretion
The Ninth Circuit in Jenkins I ignored the distinction between subsequent
charges based on unrelated conduct and subsequent charges based on conduct
arising out of the same factual nucleus.' 65  Because this rule departs from
Martinez, which stressed the importance of this distinction in determining
substantially curtailed by this and other courts."); United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1), 504 F.3d
694, 705 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980))
("The doctrine of vindictive prosecution does not diminish the principle of prosecutorial
discretion."). For an argument in favor of expanding the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness
to afford criminal defendants additional protections, see Breathing New Life Into Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2092-97 (2001) (asserting that the current
criminal-law system is evidence of the need to reform the doctrine).
161. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (listing factors such as "the strength of the case, the
prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's
relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan").
162. Jenkins I, 504 F.3d at 701-02.
163. Cf United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360, 1365 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the
Fifth Circuit looks to see whether a defendant could realistically believe the prosecution's charges
were vindictive).
164. See United States v. Wasman, 468 U.S. 559, 566 (1984) (explaining the reluctance in
extending the Blackledge doctrine); see also Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (addressing the selective
prosecution doctrine generally, but also noting the inherent difficulties in judicial oversight of
charging decisions).
165. Jenkins II, 518 F.3d at 725, 728 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).
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whether the presumption arises, courts following Jenkins I are left to wonder
just how important the distinction really should be. Particularly because other
circuits treat this distinction as dispositive evidence of no vindictive motive,
Jenkins I creates significant confusion among the circuits. 166 Because other
circuits have expressed disagreement with the Ninth Circuit in this area, other
circuits will likely not follow Jenkins 1.167 With respect to the vindictiveness
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit seems to be moving in the opposite direction of the
other circuits.
In addition, the Jenkins I decision seems to raise the bar for the showing that
the prosecution must make to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness. In
Jenkins I, the court did not consider a subsequent confession under oath to be
an intervening circumstance, which would rebut the presumption. 68 However,
the Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, finding that such
testimony clearly strengthens a prosecutor's case, constitutes a meaningful
intervening event, and therefore undermines any allegation of
vindictiveness. 169 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has identified several ways by
which prosecutors may overcome the presumption once it is established, each
of which is at least somewhat incompatible with Jenkins. 70  However, the
Ninth Circuit does not provide such guidance, and courts looking to Jenkins I
will likely find that more is required of prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit to
rebut the presumption of vindictiveness. The consequence of this heightened
standard is that courts may now provide defendants, such as Jenkins, blanket
immunity for crimes committed and admitted under oath.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because defendants must be able to defend themselves without fearing
retaliation from prosecutors, the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness is
166. See Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Peoples,
360 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974)) ("A
presumption of vindictiveness arises only when a prosecutor chooses to bring a more serious
charge against a defendant in a second trial."); United States v. Miller, 948 F.2d 631, 633 (10th
Cir. 1991); Humphrey v. United States, 888 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11 th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 244 (6th Cir. 1979).
167. See, e.g., Andrews, 612 F.2d at 244 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of Supreme Court vindictive prosecution precedent).
168. United States v. Jenkins (Jenkins 1), 504 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2007). Particularly
because there was a potential Miranda violation during the arrest for the first border-smuggling
incident, it would make sense that an under-oath confession would be a compelling intervening
circumstance. See id. at 704 (Conlon, J., dissenting) (concluding that Jenkins's trial testimony
was much stronger evidence when compared to the confession to the border official).
169. See Williams, 481 F.3d at 501 (finding that testimony which was under oath and subject
to cross-examination was much stronger evidence than out-of-court statements).
170. See Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing that acceptable
explanations for delay in bringing charges include "mistake or oversight in the initial action, a
different approach to prosecutorial duty by the successor prosecutor, or public demand for
prosecution on the additional crimes allegedly committed").
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necessary in certain procedural settings. That, however, is the extent of the
doctrine. As the Supreme Court has articulated, the Due Process Clause is not
designed to give defendants any type of umbrella protection against legitimate
charges by the government. 171 The effect of the Ninth Circuit's rule in Jenkins
I is that defendants may become immune to prosecution for crimes they admit
to committing while on trial for separate criminal behavior. United States v.
Jenkins exemplifies the Ninth Circuit's expansion of the doctrine beyond its
original purpose as a procedural safeguard into a defendant's weapon that
accomplishes far more than protecting due process rights.
171. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
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